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SCENIC PROTECTION AS A LEGITIMATE
GOAL OF PUBLIC REGULATION
BY NORMAN WILLIAMS*
The propriety of public regulations of private activity that are based
on aesthetic criteria - what is, or is not, pleasing to the sense of sight
- has been the subject of long and serious debate. Without recounting
again that long controversy,I it is safe to say that the courts have been
moving steadily towards recognition that such regulation is a legiti-
mate governmental activity, so long as the means chosen (by eminent
domain, police-power regulation or what not) seem reasonably adapted
to further the suggested aesthetic goal. Of course, reasonable people
may often differ as to whether certain things are or are not beautiful in
particular situations; and for this reason, most courts have, in recogniz-
ing the validity of aesthetic criteria, stopped just short of giving them
the same degree of respect normally accorded to considerations of pub-
lic health and safety.2 However, the tendency in recent case law has
been to note that in many situations there is a widespread consensus
that A would be ugly if placed in surroundings characterized by B-a
junk yard in a pleasant residential district would be an obvious exam-
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Arizona College of Law. B.A. Yale University, 1938; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1943.
1. For my views on this subject, see I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAW (2d ed. 1988) (ch. 11).
2. The Supreme Court has apparently given more or less unqualified approval to
aesthetic regulations, without bothering with such a reservation, in a case where its
multiple opinions created great confusion, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981) (White J, speaking for the plurality but no indication of dissent on this
point in the four other opinions in this case). In fact this basic point was the only one in
Metromedia which commanded unanimous assent. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954) (involving eminent domain).
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pie. In such situations the courts have been willing to uphold the ap-
plication of restrictions based on aesthetic criteria without worrying
about how to deal with the more difficult problems at the margin,
where reasonable people may reasonably differ.3 Within the above
context, the question of scenic protection as a legitimate goal has come
up in a considerable number of recent cases, and the answer has been
clear and definite-yes, this is a legitimate public goal. The reason for
this is simple enough: with the widespread increase in both income and
leisure time, many more people are able to-and have the opportunity
to-indulge their preferences for a visually attractive environment, and
public bodies have been responding with protective measures. The
point is obvious enough so that it has penetrated to the economic devel-
opment industry in several states, and so an environment to attract
tourism is now recognized as an important part of the economic base of
such areas. After all, conventions do not go to New Orleans to enjoy
the salubrious climate, and they do go to Vermont to enjoy the moun-
tain views in the background.4 A small but fairly solid body of law has
thus been accumulating on the question of protecting scenic views-
whether this is a legitimate aim of public regulation and whether the
restrictions adopted are reasonably appropriate to carry out the legiti-
mate goal.
Courts settled the issue of the validity of using eminent domain for
this purpose fairly early. The legal power to use such regulations to
protect specific views has been the subject of some doubt, as with po-
lice-power regulation for aesthetic purposes generally. Neighbors have
often wanted to use the public regulatory powers to insure that vacant
land remained unused, and a line of older cases have, not unreasona-
3. See particularly United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metucker, 42 N.J. 1,
198 A.2d 447 (1964). The courts have been equally comfortable in upholding such
regulations in an analogous situation, where again the distinctions made are clear
enough to give some assurance of equal treatment in administration - that is, in historic
districts based on a distinctive architectural style, where the observable special charac-
teristics of that style provide clear standards for administering the regulations.
4. A particularly striking example of this economics-plus-aesthetics rationale, in the
realm of practical political action, took place in Vermont. In the late 1960's, when the
Legislature was considering the bill to prohibit (and to remove) billboards in Vermont,
the local motel and hotel association strongly supported it and helped its passage: they
understood that no one was going to come up and stay in their motels to look at a row
of billboards.
In adopting this rationale in one of the early historic-district cases, the Louisiana
court wrote an opinion that sounded more like a publicity release from the New Orleans
Chamber of Commerce than ajudicial opinion. See New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La.
852, 858, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (1941).
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bly, been reluctant to approve this. Nonetheless, there has been a
marked move towards upholding well-considered provisions for scenic
protection generally, and a group of recent cases has gone a long way
in approving both the general principle and important specific applica-
tions thereof.
EMINENT DoMAiN
Condemnation of land, in part to afford an opportunity to see scenic
views, was approved long ago, and has never seriously been questioned
in principle.5 The Los Angeles County Highway Department sought
to condemn a scenic strip of land running between mountains and the
Pacific shore, located wholly within a privately-owned ranch and con-
taining roads with no connections to roads beyond the ranch.6 When
this action was challenged as not for a public use, the Court upheld it
easily.7
The ranch owners concede that a genuine highway, in fact
adapted as a way of convenience or necessity for public use and
travel, is a public use. Their real contention is that these particu-
lar roads, while called highways are "highways" in name merely,
that is, that they are shams under the name of public improve-
ments, which cannot, in fact, furnish ways of convenience or ne-
cessity to the travelling public. This argument is based upon the
fact that they extend through the ranch alone, the main road ter-
minating within its boundaries, and connect with no other public
roads at their western and northern ends. These roads will, how-
ever, be open to the general public to such extent as it can and
may use them....
But aside from these considerations, these roads, especially the
main road, through its connection with the public road coming
along the shore from Santa Monica, will afford a highway for per-
sons desiring to travel along the shore to the county line, with a
view of the ocean on the one side, and of the mountain range on
the other, constituting, as stated by the trial judge, a scenic high-
way of great beauty. Public uses are not limited, in the modern
view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordinary conven-
5. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923). Cf United States v.
Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (upholding the use of eminent
domain on behalf of historic preservation and patriotism).
6. Id. at 703.
7. Id. at 705, 710.
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ience, but may extend to matters of public health, recreation and
enjoyment. Thus, the condemnation of lands for public parks is
now universally recognized as a taking for public use. Shoemaker
v. United States, 147 U.S. 252, 297. A road need not be for a
purpose of business to create a public exigency; air, exercise and
recreation are important to the general health and welfare; plea-
sure travel may be accommodated as well as business travel; and
highways may be condemned to places of pleasing natural scenery.
Higginson v. Nahart, 11 Allen (Mass.) 530, 536. The Riverside
Drive in New York is as essentially a highway for public use as
Broadway; the Speedway in this city, as Pennsylvania Avenue.
And manifestly, in these days of general public travel in motor
cars for health and recreation, such a highway as this, extending
for more than twenty miles along the shores of the Pacific at the
base of a range of mountains, must be regarded as a public use.
For these reasons we conclude that these highways will, as
found by the trial judge, afford accommodation to the traveling
public, and that the taking of land for them is a taking for a public
use authorized by the laws of California.8
However, the use of eminent domain to protect scenery is subject to
judicial review as applied in particular cases. A Maine statute author-
ized the taking of land more than 1,000 feet from a highway right-of-
way, in order to protect scenic values along the highway. In a chal-
lenge to this provision,9 the court upheld the principle of the statute in
general but held that the area authorized to be taken was too wide and
that there was no evidence of real scenic values beyond 1,000 feet. 1
With regard to the statute's grant of power to the commission-
ers to acquire land along and adjacent to the highway "to provide
roadside and landscape development for the preservation and de-
velopment of natural scenic beauty" and "to integrate the public
improvement with the aesthetics of the area traversed by the high-
way" (emphasis added), it would seem, and we so hold, that the
concept - natural scenic beauty -, although more generally used
in a subjective sense, connotes, in terms of highway beautification,
a sufficiently definite concrete image when tested objectively so as
to furnish in and of itself an adequate standard for the measure-
ment of a proper exercise of discretion in a taking for such
purposes.
8. 262 U.S. at 706-08.
9. Finks v. Maine State Highway Commission, 328 A.2d 791 (Me. 1974).
10. Id. at 800.
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So long as the taking, whether of a single parcel of land or of
multiple parcels, results in one comprehensive area which is both
contiguous to and near the highway, the end legislative result is
reached. The only limitation is that the exercise of the power be
not abused, as by reason of an unreasonable excessive taking or for
arbitrary purposes inconsistent with the intent of the law.
We can envision circumstances in which a taking of over 1000
feet of land by the Commission for highway beautification might
be justified. Such might be the case if the shore of a lake or river
might be somewhat beyond 1000 feet from the edge of the high-
way right of way. To take less than the full distance to the lake or
river might leave a small area which, if not taken, could frustrate
the very purpose of the Act.
The taking in the instant case in excess of 1000 feet from the
edge of the highway right of way was unreasonable and an abuse
of power. The record negates the existence of an unusual pictur-
esque landscape on the fringes of the 1000 feet scenic highway
border strip which, if not taken, would defeat the ends of this leg-
islation. The land beyond 1000 feet is made up of marshlands and
tidal flats and is indistinguishable from the entire surrounding
area. It presents no likelihood of future development inimical to
the preservation of the scenic value of the capsulated view from
the highway. There is no natural boundary within immediate
reach, such as a river, lake or mount, to permit a reasonable exten-
sion of the taking and yet keep it within the scope of a sensible
application of the concept of land along, and adjacent to, the
highway. 11
REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER
The Older Case Law - On Individual Views
It is fairly common to find in the older case law expressions of judi-
cial reluctance to approve restrictions on land use, when these would
keep land open merely so that neighbors could continue to enjoy a fa-
miliar view. Two examples will suffice. In an old Michigan case, 12 a
town sought to enjoin violation of an ordinance requiring permits to
drill for oil in connection with an application for a permit to drill on
low-lying land between a bluff and an adjacent lake, and next to the
11. Id. at 796, 798-99, 800 (quoting 23 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 651 (1970)).
12. City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
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city dump. 3 The Michigan court held the ordinance was valid as a
general matter but invalid as applied to this particular area, and noted
that there was no serious contention that this particular land could be
used, as zoned, for residence.14
Practically all the witnesses agreed that the lowland was useless
for residence purposes. The principal reason for maintaining this
property in the residence zone appears to be that the rear of the
property on the bluff overlooks it, and that the masts of the oil
derricks temporarily used in drilling operations would be visible
from Ruddiman Avenue.15
Similarly, in a more recent New York case, 16 the court rejected, with
the following comment, an appeal brought by neighbors to challenge
an area variance permitting splitting a lot in two.17
The principal objection of the neighboring landowners is di-
rected at the clearing of the large, and apparently visually pleas-
ant, wooded area for the building of the new residence and its
access road and to the construction of a road that would run be-
hind the homes of several of the objectors. While the neighbors
might, quite understandably, feel aggrieved by the pending loss of
the aesthetic effect generated by the De Poy premises, in the ab-
sence of statute or ordinance to the contrary, the De Poys could
cut the trees and clear the area, for any reason at all, and were not
under an obligation to maintain their home grounds for the benefit
of their surrounding neighbors. The proposed road itself, while
not as scenic as the natural wooded land, amply meets the require-
ments of the Town Law.
18
Scenic Protection as a Legitimate Goal - Major Holdings
A number of important cases, arising out of the environmental
movement, have explicitly approved the use of various public regula-
tory powers in order to protect specific scenic values. As so often hap-
pens, New York and California courts have led the way. In the Storm
13. Id. at 54, 227 N.W. at 743.
14. Id. at 59, 227 N.W. at 745.
15. Id. at 57, 227 N.W. at 744. In such a situation, where there is no evidence of
special scenic value, similar decisions may still be expected.
16. Conley v. Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals, 40 N.Y.2d 309, 353 N.E.2d
594, 386 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1976).
17. Id. at 312, 353 N.E.2d at 595-96, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
18. Id. at 315, 353 N.E.2d at 597, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
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King case,19 one of the first of the recent major environmental contro-
versies, a public utility (Consolidated Edison) proposed to obtain addi-
tional peak-hour power in the lower Hudson Valley by an elaborate
arrangement--creating a artificial reservoir on top of Storm King
Mountain, 1,000 feet above the river level-and the Federal Power
Commission granted a license for this purpose.20 In a challenge by a
wide variety of neighboring groups, the Second Circuit held that the
Federal Power Commission had construed its mandate much too nar-
rowly and had failed to consider various alternatives and various envi-
ronmental concerns.21
The Storm King project is to be located in an area of unique
beauty and major historical significance. The highlands and gorge
of the Hudson offer one of the finest pieces of river scenery in the
world. The great German traveler Baedeker called it "finer than
the Rhine." Petitioners' contention that the Commission must
take these factors into consideration in evaluating the Storm King
project is justified by the history of the Federal Power Act.
"Recreational purposes" are expressly included among the ben-
eficial public uses to which the statute refers. The phrase un-
doubtedly encompasses the conservation of natural resources, the
maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic
sites. See Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 216
F.2d 509, 511-512 (7th Cir. 1954). All of these "beneficial uses,"
the Supreme Court has observed, "while unregulated, might well
be contradictory rather than harmonious." Federal Power
Comm. v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90, 98, 85 S.Ct. 1253, 1258
(1965). In licensing a project, it is the duty of the Federal Power
Commission properly to weigh each factor.
The Commission should reexamine all questions on which we
have found the record insufficient and all related matters. The
Commission's renewed proceedings must include as a basic, con-
cern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a
project is only one of several factors to be considered. The record
as it comes to us fails markedly to make out a case for the Storm
King project on, among other matters, costs, public convenience
19. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
20. Id. at 611-12.
21. Id. at 612.
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and necessity, and absence of reasonable alternatives. 22
In California, the state prevailed in an action to enforce the require-
ment for county contributions to implement a two-state interstate com-
pact regulating development around Lake Tahoe on the Nevada-
California border.23 Again, the court emphasized the quality of the
scenery.
The controversy which we are required to review focuses upon
the Lake Tahoe Basin - an area of unique and unsurpassed
beauty situated high in the Sierras along the California-Nevada
border. Mark Twain, an early visitor to the region, viewed the
lake as "a noble sheet of blue water lifted six thousand three hun-
dred feet above the level of the sea ... with the shadows of the
mountains brilliantly photographed upon its still surface ... the
fairest picture the whole earth affords." Year after year the lake
and its surrounding mountains have attracted and captivated
countless visitors from all over the world.
However, there is a good reason to fear that the region's natural
wealth contains the virus of its ultimate impoverishment. A stag-
gering increase in population, a greater mobility of people, an af-
fluent society and an incessant urge to invest, to develop, to
acquire and merely to spend-all have combined to pose a severe
threat to the Tahoe region. Only recently has the public become
aware of the delicate balance of the ecology, and of the complex
interrelated natural processes which keep the lake's waters clear
and fresh, preserve the mountains from unsightly erosion, and
maintain all forms of wildlife at appropriate levels. Today, and
for the foreseeable future, the ecology of Lake Tahoe stands in
grave danger before a mounting wave of population and
development.
Even without such explicit findings we could hardly avoid a
conclusion that the purpose of the Compact is to conserve the nat-
ural resources and control the environment of the Tahoe Basin as
a whole through area-wide planning. Lake Tahoe itself is an inter-
state body of water; the surrounding region, defined by the Com-
pact, is also interstate, since it includes not only the lake but the
adjacent parts of three counties of Nevada and two counties of
California.... The water that the Agency is to purify cannot be
22. Id. at 613, 614, 621-22, 624-25 (citation omitted). See also Washington Depart-
ment of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 936 (1954).
23. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 488-90, 487 P.2d
1193, 1197, 1210-11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556-81 (1971) (citation omitted).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/2
AESTHETICS
confined within one county or state; it circulates freely throughout
Lake Tahoe. The air which the Agency must preserve from pollu-
tion knows no political boundaries. The wildlife which the
Agency should protect ranges freely from one local jurisdiction to
another. Nor can the population and explosive development
which threaten the region be contained by any of the local author-
ities which govern parts of the Tahoe Basin. Only an agency tran-
scending local boundaries can devise, adopt and put into operation
solutions for the problems besetting the region as a whole. In-
deed, the fact that the Compact is the product of the cooperative
efforts is impressive proof that its subject matter and objectives are
of regional rather than local concern.
There is also a beneficial right in the People of the State of Cali-
fornia to compel the counties to perform their duty. The unique
scenic attributes which the Agency must preserve are enjoyed not
only by the residents of the region but also by large numbers of the
state's general citizenry. Failure of respondent counties to provide
funds for the Agency at once impairs the functioning of that body
and disturbs the harmony and effectiveness of interstate relations.
The state, as a party to the interstate Compact, and as an entity
which contributes funds to the Agency, has an important interest
in securing the success of the Agency.24
Other recent opinions have been in accord. When the question was
squarely raised in a Virginia federal case,2" the court held invalid a
designation by the Secretary of the Interior of much of a rural county
in Virginia as a "landmark," together with his acceptance of preserva-
tion easements for the same purpose, because of insufficient standards
and because of a confusion in the use of the two statutes involved.26
Local resistance to development in Louisa County was originally pro-
voked by a federal grant for a proposed state prison.27 The court noted
"a beautiful and remarkably well-preserved concentration of eight-
eenth and nineteenth century buildings of architectural merit,"'28 but
24. Id. at 485-86, 493-94, 491-92, 487 P.2d at 1194-95, 1201, 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
554-55, 561, 559 (citations omitted).
25. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980).
26. Id. The Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-
69 (1982 & Supp. VI 1988); National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470-470w-6 (1982 & Supp. VI 1988).
27. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1132 (4th Cir. 1971).
28. 497 F. Supp. at 842. See also Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (holding that the environmental protec-
tion amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution was not self-executing).
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indicated some problem with the notion of a "historic site" about the
size of Manhattan.29
The principal Maine environmental legislation30 requires that new
projects reviewed under the Act should not adversely affect existing
scenic character, natural resources or property values. In the first im-
portant case, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the statute31 with the
following comment:
While the Legislature has used general language in requiring proof
that the proposed development has adequate provision for fitting
itself harmoniously into the existing natural environment, the Leg-
islature has throughout the Act pointed out the specific respects in
which the development must not offend the public interest and in
which the development would be ecologically inharmonious. The
Act recognized the public interest in the preservation of the envi-
ronment because of its relationship to the quality of human life,
and in insisting that the public's existing uses of the environment
and its enjoyment of the scenic values and natural resources re-
ceive consideration, the Legislature used terms capable of being
understood in the context of the entire bill. The Legislature has
declared the public interest in preserving the environment from
anything more than minimal destruction to be superior to the
owner's rights in the use of his land and has given the Commission
adequate standards under which to carry out the legislative
purpose.32
Another group of cases has mentioned the concern for scenic re-
sources briefly in passing, and with approval. For example, in a chal-
lenge to a transmission line, the Vermont Supreme Court noted a
finding by the Public Utilities Commission that the proposed alignment
would actually involve less interference with scenery than other possi-
ble routes, and implicitly approved that finding.33 In a federal case,34
29. 497 F. Supp. at 847.
30. Site Location of Development, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490 (1989
& Supp. 1989).
31. In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736 (1973).
32. Id. at 751.
33. Vermont Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Bandel, 135 Vt. 141, 151, 375 A.2d 975,
981 (1977). This is the fifth time this legal proceeding reached the Vermont Supreme
Court. Id. at 143, 375 A.2d at 977. Vermont has passed a substantial body of legisla-
tion protecting various aspects of its scenery, and there is one additional incidental indi-
cation of local judicial attitudes to such regulation. In National Advertising Co. v.
Cooley, 126 Vt. 263, 227 A.2d 406 (1967), Chief Justice Holden dissented from the
majority's decision to make a final decision upholding a local ordinance (restricting
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an applicant challenged the refusal of an oil and gas lease at Jackson
Hole, on the ground that the proposed lease would violate the policy in
an Interior Department memorandum issued by Secretary Krug.3 5
The Court noted that the whole area "is world renowned for its
beauty" and that the Krug memorandum represented an obvious com-
promise of conflicting interests.3 6 A California3 7 decision upheld the
disapproval of a subdivision in the Santa Monica Mountains which
would involve massive changes in the terrain, including extensive grad-
ing and filling.38 The Court described the proposal and held as follows:
Since the home sites are to be on the top of ridges, the houses will
restrict ocean view from other parts of the Santa Monica moun-
tains and view of the mountains from significant parts of the ocean
and ocean frontage.
The record is replete with evidence that the proposed develop-
ment would create a major increase in the traffic using Pacific
Coast Highway.... The record shows that, without the proposed
development, Pacific Coast Highway is already overused, with fre-
quent bumper-to-bumper delays....
It is also clear that the proposed development involved a major
change in the natural environment, removing natural vegetation,
leveling hills and destroying a natural and scenic canyon ...
The same adverse effect of the proposed development falls
within the requirement of [CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30240] that
the natural habitat of the area not be excessively damaged.
In short, we cannot say that the commission, and the trial
court, erred in regarding the cumulative effect of this large devel-
opment as such as to fall without the permitted development that
the statute envisages.39
In one of the first acreage zoning cases in the state of New York, 40 the
court upheld such a requirement in a remote village at the northern
billboards), and commented: "I believe there is more involved in this declaration than
the contamination of our scenic landscape." 126 Vt. at 270, 227 A.2d at 410.
34. Learned v. Watt, 528 F. Supp. 980 (D. Wyo. 1981).
35. Id. at 981.
36. Id.
37. Belmar Estates v. California Coastal Commission, 115 Cal. App. 3d 936, 171
Cal. Rptr. 773 (1981).
38. Id. at 941, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
39. Id. at 938-39, 941-42, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 774, 776.
40. Gignoux v. Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950).
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end of a peninsula on Long Island as an appropriate move to provide a
rural community for those who might desire the advantages of a quiet
area and the beauty of rural surroundings.41
Protection of Specific Views
Another group of cases has upheld specific devices to protect partic-
ular aspects of an attractive view. These decisions included approval of
the Denver Mountain View ordinance, a general view-protection ordi-
nance in a Los Angeles suburb and a requirement affecting the color of
paint in a historic district.
The view from Denver of the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains
is one of the city's substantial assets. Since the 1960s, a city ordinance
has protected this view to the West from a group of parks in Denver.
The ordinance, based on an angle of view - which new buildings are
not permitted to intercept - reads as follows:
2. (b) Limitations on construction. No part of a structure
within the area on the attached map indicated by shading or cross-
hatching shall exceed an elevation of five thousand five hundred
forty-eight (5,548) feet above mean sea level plus two (2) feet for
each one hundred (100) feet that said part of a structure is hori-
zontally distant from the reference point...
(c) Reference point. The reference point is a point having an
elevation of five thousand five hundred forty-eight (5,548) feet
above mean sea level .... 42
The ordinance was recently challenged for the first time, in connection
with an amendment extending its protection to the views from an addi-
tional park in southeast Denver.43 This was done in order to prevent
construction of a proposed 21-story office building (permitted under
zoning) which would block part of that view from the newly-protected
park.4 The court reviewed the situation carefully, and upheld the
ordinance.
The trial judge viewed each of the parties covered by the ordi-
nance and made an express finding that there was a "panoramic
mountain view" from the sighting point in Southmoor Park.
It has been well established that protection of aesthetics is a
41. Id. at 491, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
42. Landmark Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 728 F.2d 1281, 1282 (10th
Cir. 1986).




legitimate function of a legislature. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32-33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.E.d 26 (1954). Especially in
the context of Denver - a city whose civic identity is associated
with its connection with the mountains - preservation of the view
of the mountains from a city park is within the city's police power.
Appellants argue that SPEHA's reason for promoting the
amendment was to protect the property values of its members'
homes, not to protect the mountain view. Assuming that this is
true, it does not affect the validity of the city council's action. The
council enacted an amendment that is clearly directly related to
preserving the mountain view - indeed, the gradations in allowa-
ble height based on distance from the sighting point are tailored to
nothing else.
Appellants argue further that, even if the protection of the
mountain view is a legitimate purpose, this must be accomplished
by a formal rezoning. Once it is settled that protection of aesthet-
ics is a legitimate function and it is clear that this amendment is
related to that goal, the city is free to choose the method of imple-
menting that goal, within the constitutional parameter that the en-
actment is not arbitrary or capricious. 4
In the strongest case to date in this field of law, an intermediate Cali-
fornia Court upheld a municipal ordinance designed to prevent block-
ing specific existing views, and the Supreme Court dismissed on
appeal.46 Under this ordinance, if neighbors felt that proposed con-
struction would impair their view, a procedure allowed the local Plan-
ning Commission to review the situation, suggest possible mitigation
measures and, where appropriate, refuse to approve plans, i.e., deny a
building permit-all subject to appeal to the City Council.4 7 When
45. Id. at 1284, 1285-86.
46. Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370, 238 Cal. Rptr. 561,
appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 983 (1987).
47. The relevant portions of the ordinance read as follows:
2. 1950. PURPOSE. The hillsides of the City constitute a limited natural re-
source in their scenic value to all residents of and visitors to the City and their
potential for vista points and view lots. It is found that the public health, safety
and welfare require prevention of needless destruction and impairment of views
and promotion of the optimum utilization and discouragement of the blockage and
misuse of such sites and view lots. The purpose of this ordinance is to promote the
health, safety and general welfare of the public through:
"(a) The protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of sites and view lots
that offer views to the residents because of the unique topographical features which
the Palos Verdes Peninsula offer, or which provide unique and irreplaceable assets
to the City and its neighboring communities or which provide for this and future
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plans for a residential addition were disapproved, plaintiffs challenged
the ordinance as being void for vagueness - emphasizing the use of
such words as "needless," "discourage," "view," "impairment" and
"significantly obstructed.", 48 However, the court decided that the ordi-
nance provided a reasonably certain standard in light of the need for
view protection, and added:
The record discloses that the Council had before it appellants'
proposal, a staff recommendation that mitigating factors be incor-
porated into the design from the City's planning director, graphs
and photographs indicating the view of city lights from the im-
pacted properties and the extent that the proposal would affect the
view, and the testimony of Stan Crawford and Margaret Larson,
who testified that their views from their residences would be af-
fected by the proposed addition. That evidence supports findings
generations examples of the unique physical surroundings which are characteristic
of the City.
"(b) The maintenance of settings which provide the amenity of a view.
"(c) The establishment of a process of design review by which the City may
render its assistance toward the objective that views enjoyed by residents of the
City will not be significantly obstructed.
"1951. EVALUATION AND REVIEW. To protect the visual quality of highly
scenic areas and maintain the rural character of the City, new development should
not degrade highly scenic natural historical or open areas and shall be visually
subordinate to the scenic quality of these areas.
"New development within the various view sheds contained in the City that
would have a significant visual impact to those living adjacent to the development,
shall be subject to design review. This review shall ensure that development and its
cumulative impact is consistent with the previously mentioned standards.
"The design procedures and standards employed in new developments, altera-
tions and additions to existing structures and lots should include appropriate meas-
ures that are consistent with appearance and design goals of the View Protection
Ordinance. Development proposals should be coordinated in order to:
"(a) Maximize open space preservation.
"(b) Protect view corridors, natural vegetation, land forms, and other features.
"(c) Minimize the appearance of visually intrusive structures.
"(d) Prevent the obstruction of property owners' views by requiring appropriate
construction of new structures or additions to existing buildings or adjacent par-
cels.
"(e) Assess the potential view loss from public areas of any proposed major
structures as well as alterations and additions to existing structures.
"(f) Determine whether other suitable design options are available to the prop-
erty owner in order that view obstructions may be eliminated or lessened in
severity.
Id. at. 374, 377, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 562-64.
48. Id. at 374-75, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63.
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of significant view impairment and of failure to mitigate the im-
pact on existing views.49
An ordinance in Paradise Valley (a wealthy Northern suburb of
Phoenix, Arizona) required new houses to blend with the mountain
background which dominates the valley, and not to reflect light unduly
-i.e., directed against white houses." The local zoning board granted
a variance from this requirement on house color, apparently because
the property owner/developer testified that all his life he had been hop-
ing to build a "Mediterranean home," with white columns.51 A neigh-
bor challenged these proceedings, and the intermediate court held that
the variance was invalid because it did not conform to the strict criteria
for variances as set forth in the Arizona statute.5
2
The Board had no authority to grant a variance to allow Mr.
DeMuro's personal preference for a color which would enhance
the design he chose for his house.
The color of a house is not a factor pertaining to the real prop-
erty or which would deprive the property of uses or privileges en-
joyed by other property of the same zoning classification.
Permission to use an unapproved color not compatible with the
requirements of the mountain building regulations also violated
the following rules and regulations of the Board which prohibit a
color variation.
The Board's stated reasons for permitting the variance clearly
demonstrate that the color variation had nothing to do with the
size, shape, topography or location of the property and could not
be a special circumstance pertaining to the real property. The per-
mission to change the color in violation of the mountain building
regulations was not necessary to relieve DeMuro from a demon-
strable hardship but rather to serve as a personal convenience.
Statutory provisions and the rules and regulations of the Board
specifically state that any hardship must relate to the use of the
land as opposed to the owner. A personal hardship does not jus-
tify a variance.53
49. Id. at 376-77, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65.
50. Arkules v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Paradise Valley, 151 Ariz. 438,439,
728 P.2d 657, 658 (Ariz. CL App. 1986).
51. Id. at 441, 728 P.2d at 660.
52. Id. at 442, 728 P.2d at 661.
53. Id. at 441-42, 728 P.2d at 660-61 (citing HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND
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Another group of recent cases are concerned with attempts to pre-
vent the blocking of particular views. The situations in these cases are
therefore somewhat analogous to the group of other decisions previ-
ously discussed. 4 In certain situations, courts have upheld restrictions
against new structures in this kind of situation, even without specific
statutory authority. For example, pre-existing development effectively
established a uniform building line along the rear of lots at the edge of
Lake Washington in Seattle. Two proposed new buildings would pro-
ject further into the lake, thereby cutting into the view from the pre-
existing houses. In a rather surprising opinion, 5 using a "balancing
test" and based partly on the state Shoreline Act, the court held that
the proposed new development was a violation and ordered it
removed. 6
We need not, in the instant case, rest our decision on the need to
protect aesthetics alone. Here, the underlying findings establish
that the loss of view substantially reduces the values of the shore-
line properties of the Huntley's and their neighbors, thus entitling
them to protection against that economic loss without payment by
the state of just compensation.
Second, the project is inconsistent with the permitted uses which
favor preservation of the shoreline's natural character and the
ecology of the shoreline. [WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020]5 7
Again, in an important decision on the comprehensive plan prob-lem," a piecemeal amendment to both the Honolulu plan and the im-
plementing zoning ordinance was adopted without full conformity with
all the proceedings then needed for original adoption of a plan in Ha-
waii.5 9 The court held that amendments must be passed by the same
procedure as the original adoption.' ° The opinion contains a striking
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW at 204). The criteria are essentially an adapta-
tion of the familiar ones derived from Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851
(1939).
54. See supra notes 9-12.
55. The Dep't. of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571
P.id 196 (1977). Cf Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 481, 778 P.2d 534
(1989) (no action in nuisance for blocking a view).
56. 89 Wash. 2d at 210-11, 571 P.2d at 199-200.
57. 89 Wash. 2d at 212-13, 571 P.2d at 201.
58. Dalton v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969).
59. Id. at 412-13, 462 P.2d at 207.
60. Id. at 416, 462 P.2d at 209.
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discussion of what is needed to provide a valid amendment to zoning
ordinances in Hawaii - in effect outlawing piecemeal zoning amend-
ments.61 Here, the challenged and invalidated amendment permitted
an increase in density in an area in Kailua, across the range from Hon-
olulu on Windward Oahu.62 The court held that plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring the suit.
Plaintiffs' interest in this case is that they "reside in very close
proximity" to the proposed development. In fact two of the plain-
tiffs apparently "live across the street from said real property"
upon which defendants plan to build high rise apartment build-
ings, thus restricting the scenic view, limiting the sense of space
and increasing the density of population. Clearly this is a "con-
crete interest" in a "legal relation." Lynch v. Borough of Hills-
dale, 136 N.J.L. 129 54 A.2d 723 (1947); see generally 3 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise 283-85 (1958). Clearly, too, this is
an "actual controversy," not merely hypothetical problem.63
Nuisance Law
In one older case, a concurring opinion argued that the law of nui-
sance should take into account aesthetic nuisances as well as others.6 4
However, this has not been followed up in the decades since.65
BEYOND THE POLICE POWER - THE INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
There is no reason why all public action in this field must be at one
of the two extremes, involving either (a) public regulation (and prohibi-
tion) of almost all rights, or (b) public acquisition of the land. There is
a lot of room for the intermediate solution, involving splitting the fee
between rights held publicly and rights left in privately. In an impor-
tant case on this subject,6 6 the Wisconsin court specifically upheld the
use of eminent domain to condemn scenic easements along the Great
61. The criteria set forth here for valid zoning amendments, along with others taken
from the nation-wide case law, have been enacted into statutory law by the Vermont
Legislature. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4384(e) (1975 & Supp. 1989).
62. 51 Haw. at 401-02, 462 P.2d at 201.
63. 51 Haw. at 403, 462 P.2d at 202.
64. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368,
concurring opinion at 192 S.E. 291 (1930).
65. See Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 481, 778 P.2d 534 (1989)
(no action in nuisance for blocking a view).
66. Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
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River Road, which runs along the Mississippi River in western Wis-
consin.67 Plaintiffs argument was essentially that acquisition of such
an easement was not for a public use, because there was no public right
of entry.68 The court specifically held that the public use requirement




"I. No use or occupation other than the hereinafter permitted use shall hereaf-
ter be established or maintained within or upon the restricted area.
"PERMITTED USE OF OCCUPATION
OF RESTRICTED AREA
"1. General crop or livestock farming including construction, erection, mainte-
nance and repair of buildings incident to such use, and construction, maintenance
or establishment of recommended soil conservation structures or practices, and
normal farm improvements.
"2. Telephone, telegraph, electric or pipelines or microwave relay structures
for the purpose of transmitting messages, heat, light or power.
"3. Single-family residential use.
"4. ***
"5. Any use not heretofore specified which exists upon or within the restricted
area as of the time of recording this instrument, including normal maintenance and
repair of existing buildings, structures and appurtenances but such use shall not be
expanded nor shall any structure be erected or structural alternations be made
within the restricted area.
"2. No dump of ashes, trash, rubbish, sawdust, garbage or offal, or any other
unsightly or offensive material shall hereafter be placed upon the restricted area.
Existing use for any such purpose shall be discontinued except where such use is
incidental to the present occupation and use of the land, and when it conforms to
applicable state and local requirements.
"3. No signs, billboards, outside advertising structures or advertisement of any
kind shall be hereafter erected, displayed, placed or maintained upon or within the
restricted area. Existing use for any such purpose shall be terminated, and any
such purpose shall be terminated, and any such signs shall be removed, on or
before July 1, 1965, except that one sign of not more than 8 square feet in size may
be erected and maintained to advertise the sale, hire or lease of the property, or the
sale and/or manufacture of goods, products or services incidental to a permitted
occupation or use of the land.
"4. No trees or shrubs shall be destroyed, cut, or removed from the restricted
area, except as may be incidental to a permitted occupation or use of the property,
or required for reasons of sanitation and disease control, and except for selective
cutting of timber by methods prescribed by written permit from the State Highway
Commission.
"5. Lots used, leased or sold within the restricted area for residential purposes
shall have a frontage on the adjacent state trunk highway 35 of not less than three
hundred (300) feet for each residence.
Id. at 259-61, 142 N.W.2d at 793-94.
68. Id. at 261, 142 N.W.2d at 795.
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was satisfied by the sort of use involved in visual enjoyment of a pleas-
ant scene.6 9
Although we have found no express statutory definition of
"scenic easement," its purpose and general meaning appear from
the legislative history just recited. It is also clear that the legisla-
ture has determined that the protection of scenic resources along
highways is a public purpose, has set the policy of acquiring scenic
easements along particular routes, in order to protect such re-
sources, and has delegated to the state highway commission the
function of deciding the exact terms of the easements to be ac-
quired, and of exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire
them.
The concept of the scenic easement springs from the idea that
there is enjoyment and recreation for the travelling public in view-
ing a relatively unspoiled natural landscape, and involves the
judgement [sic] that in preserving existing scenic beauty as inex-
pensively as possible a line can reasonably be drawn between ex-
isting, or agricultural (and in these cases very limited residential)
uses, and uses which have not yet commenced but involve more
jarring human interference with a state of nature. We think both
views can reasonably be held.
The learned trial judge succinctly answered plaintiffs' claim that
occupancy by the public is essential in order to have public use by
saying that in the instant case, "the 'occupancy' is visual." The
enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes along
the highway seems to us to be a direct use by the public of the
rights in land which have been taken in the form of a scenic ease-
ment, and not a mere incidental benefit from the owner's private
use of the land.
We are aware of the doctrine that zoning restrictions imposed
under the police power cannot be based solely on aesthetic consid-
erations, although the court has expressed doubt whether this is
any longer the law. Plaintiffs do recognize of course, that the im-
position of restrictions on use involved here is not an exercise of
police power. The state is taking a portion of plaintiffs' property
rights, and just compensation will be paid for what is taken.
Whatever may be the law with respect to zoning restrictions
based upon aesthetic considerations, a stronger argument can be
made in support of the power to take property, in return for just
69. Id. at 265, 142 N.W.2d at 797.
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compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, than for the
imposition of police power restrictions for such purposes. More
importantly, however, we consider that the concept of preserving
a scenic corridor along a parkway, with its emphasis upon main-
taining a rural scene and preventing unsightly uses is sufficiently
definite so that the legislature may be said to have made a mean-
ingful decision in terms of public purpose, and to have fixed a
standard which sufficiently guides the commission in performing
its task.70
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Finally, in an important recent Supreme Court decision, the7 1 Court
split five to four on the validity of the California Coastal Commission's
requirement of an easement of passage along a beach, connecting two
public beaches, as a condition for permission to reconstruct and en-
large a house on the coast.7 2 This is one of the recent cases which may
have made (or tried to make) a major change in land use law.7 3 The
principal difference between Justice Scalia's majority opinion and the
dissents by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens lies in the use of
the presumption. Scalia has been trying in effect to reverse the normal
presumption of validity and impose strict scrutiny on such regulations,
of economic activity, much in the fashion of the Lochner era,7 4 and
much of Supreme Court law before 1937. The decision probably fore-
shadows a considerably more critical attitude towards various develop-
ment exactions, on which towns all over the country have been running
wild with very little statutory authority.
The lack of nexus between the condition and the original pur-
pose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something
other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply,
the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may
be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in the takings and
land use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless the per-
70. Id. at 263-66, 142 N.W.2d at 796-97 (citations omitted).
71. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For my view of
the long-term significance of Nollan and other recent decisions in the Supreme Court,
see Williams & Ernst, And Now We Are Here On A Darkling Plain, 13 VT. L. REV. 635
(1989).
72. 483 U.S. at 827.
73. Id. at 826.
74. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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mit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the devel-
opment ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but "an out-and-out plan of extortion." ... 7V
Justice Brennan dissenting, challenged the Court's characterization
of the regulation.
The deed restriction on which permit approval was conditioned
would directly address this threat to the public's access to the tide-
lands. It would provide a formal declaration of the public's right
of access, thereby ensuring that the shifting character of the tide-
lands, and the presence of private development immediately adja-
cent to it, would not jeopardize enjoyment of that right. The
imposition of the permit condition was therefore directly related
to the fact that appellant's development would be "located along a
unique stretch of coast where lateral access is inadequate due to
the construction of private residential structures and shoreline
protective devices along a fluctuating shoreline." The deed re-
striction was crafted to deal with the particular character of the
beach along which appellants sought to build, and with the spe-
cific problems created by expansion of development toward the
public tidelands. In imposing the restriction, the State sought to
ensure that such development would not disrupt the historical ex-
pectation of the public regarding access to the sea.
The Court is therefore simply wrong that there is no reasonable
relationship between the permit condition and the specific type of
burden on public access created by the appellants' proposed devel-
opment. Even were the Court desirous of assuming the added re-
sponsibility of closely monitoring the regulation of development
along the California coast, this record reveals rational public ac-
tion by any conceivable standard.76
CONCLUSION
The 20th century has seen a fairly steady progression toward clarifi-
cation of legal doctrine on aesthetic regulations in two respects:
1. The importance and the legal validity of encouraging improved
aesthetics in the environment, and
2. An increasing sophistication on how to define aesthetic
problems in such a way as to make them subject, not to whim and
caprice but to the rule of law, with equal treatment for all. As far as
scenic protection is concerned, the three major new decisions at the
75. 483 U.S. at 837 (citations omitted).
76. 483 U.S. at 851-53 (citations omitted).
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
24 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:3
end of the 1980's have crystallized the situation. For, on the authority
of experienced courts in important states, we have it (a) that the height
of new buildings may be restricted to preserve the vista of a major
mountain range, (b) that new development in a residential neighbor-
hood may be held up, and modifications may be required, if a proposed
development would block a neighbor's existing views, and
(c) apparently even that public decision-making may prescribe the
color of a house. We do not need anything more to speak confidently
about the law in this field as settled: legal protection of scenic values is
a legitimate goal of public endeavor, at least so long as the scenic val-
ues may be clearly defined. And it must not be forgotten that the
Supreme Court has, not very thoughtfully, lent its general rhetorical
support along the same lines.
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